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SOME LEGAL ASPECTS OF THE INVASION OF BELGIUM
In the fifth century before the Christian era the two powerful
states of Greece, Athens and Sparta, were at war. Greek culture
was then at its highest level, and Athens was the centre-in the
phrase of Pericles, "the school of Hellas." Its attainments in
art, letters, and government were a source of pride and the basis
of the Athenian claim of superiority. During the progress of that
long and terrible war, the Athenians conceived that the neutrality
of a small colony on the little island of Melos was a military
disadvantage, and an army was sent to reduce it to subjection.
An embassy was dispatched to acquaint the settlers with the purpose of the invading army. A delegation representing the
Melians met the embassy and a conference was held in which the
views of the strong and the weak were exchanged. Recent
events in Europe give the story of this interview, as related by
Thucydides, a new interest. The following extract from the
history of the Peloponnesian war contains the main points:
41 Athenians:
'Well, then, we Athenians will use no fine words; we will not
go out of our way to prove at length that we have a right to rule because we
overthrew the Persians, or that we attack you because we are suffering any
injury at your hands . . . . Nor must you expect to convince us by arguing
that although a colony of the Lacedremonians, you have taken no part in
their expeditions or that you have done us no wrong. But you and we should
say what we really think and aim only at what is possible, for we both aiike
know that into the discussion of human affairs the question of justice enters only
when the pressure of necessity is equal, and that the powerful exact what they can'
and the weak grant what they must.'
41 Melians:
'Well, then, since you set aside justice and invite us to speak
of expediency, in our judgment it is certainty expedient that you should respect
a principle that is for the common good: and that to every man when in peril a
reasonable claim should be accounted a claim of right . . . . Your interest in this
principle is quite as great as ours, inasmuch as you, if you fall, will incur the
heaviest vengeance and will be the most terrible example to mankind.'
41 Athenians: 'Thisisadangeryoumayleaveto us . . . . We want to make
you ours with the least trouble to ourselves.'
41 Melians:
'It may be to your interest to be our masters, but how can it be
to ours to be your slaves? '
41 Athenians:
'To you the gain will be that by submission you will avert
the worst.'
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II Melians:
'But must we be your enemies? Will you not receive us as
friends if we are neutral and remain at peace with you?'
II Athenians:
'No, your enmity is not half so mischievous to us as your
friendship, for the one is in the eye of our subjects an argument of our power,
the other of our weakness.'
"Melians: 'But do you not recognize another danger? .. Will you
not be making enemies of all who are now neutrals? When they see
how you are treating us, they will expect you some day to turn against
them.'
"Athenians: 'We do not consider our really dangerous enemies to be
()ne of the peoples inhabiting the mainland, who, secure in their freedom, may
defer indefinitely any measure of precaution they may take against us, but
islanders, who, like you, happen to be under no contro1.'
" Melians: ' We know only too well how hard the struggle will be against
your power. Nevertheless we do not despair of fortune for we hope to stand
as high as you in the favour of heaven because we are righteous and you,
against whom we contend, are unrighteous.'
"Athenians: 'As for the Gods, we expect to have quite as much of their
favour as you; for we are not doing or claiming anything which goes beyond
common opinion about divine, or men's desires about human, things. For of
the Gods we believe, and of men we know, that by a law of their nature, whenever they can rule, they will. The law was not made by us and we are not the
first who have acted upon it. But do you not see that the path of expediency
is safe, whereas justice and honour involve danger in practice?'
"Melians: 'Men of Athens, our resolution is unchanged, and we will
not in a moment surrender that liberty which our city, founded seven hundred
years ago, still enjoys; we will trust to that good fortune which by the favour
of the God(has hitherto preserved us, and for human help, to the Lacedremonians, and endeavour to save ourselves. We are ready, however, to be your
friends, and the enemies, neither of you, nor the Lacedremonians.' "

The strong prevailed and Thucydides closes the narrative
with the brief statement that "the Athenians thereupon put'to
death all who were of military age and made slaves of the women
and children. They then colonized the island, sending thither
five hundred settlers of their own."
Coming on the eve of the disastrous expedition to Sicily, the
first of a series of defeats, after which the greatness of Athens lay
in the past, the fate of Melos made a profound impression on reflecting minds. While Thucydides confines himself to a bare narrative of events, the space given to the incident is suggestive. To
it is attributed one of the most tragic of Greek dramas, Euripides'
Trojan Women, in which the glorious feat of arms related by
Homer is seen from another angle--the angle of cities in ashes,
of dead bodies polluting the air, of children slain before the eyes
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of mothers, of the flower of Trojan womanhood condemned to
lives of degradation and dishonour.
Twenty-three centuries have elapsed since Melos was punished
for asserting the doctrine of the rights of man. Again war is
raging between great powers. One of them is the school of
western civilization, to whose universities students flock from all
quarters of the globe. Her contribution to art, letters, science,
industry, government, is so distinctive that the phrase" German
culture" has passed into current use. The neutrality of a small
state was an obstacle in the execution of her military plans, and
an army was assembled on its borders. The plea of the neutral
state that "it desired to be at peace, that it owed the duty to be
neutral under treaty obligations, was rejected. When it was
suggested that she could not without dishonour permit the use of
her territory for the benefit of another, the answer was returned,
as on a former occasion, that "the path of expediency is saf~,
whereas justice and honour involve danger in practice." The
little state chose the course of the Melians. Not all of her male
citizens of military age have been put to death; but thousands
have been slain, cities are in ashes, homes burned, women and
children in exile, and finally, under the guise of war exaction,
fines amounting to millions of dollars have been imposed on a
people whose sole offence is that it attempted to perform a
plain duty.
Belgium was invaded because she had the best military road
to France. When it was suggested that the Belgian treaty might
involve other nations in the war, the German Chancellor, if
correctly reported in the press, expressed surprise that" a piece
of paper" should be taken so seriously. No explanation of the
language used has been given to the public and the meaning must
be inferred. The phrase suggests that the breach was technical,
that it involved form rather than substance. As a direct result
of the breach, a country once prosperous is now desolate, and
thousands are without food or shelter. The purpose of the agreement was to prevent the ravages of war, and the defeat of the
purpose is not in a legal sense a technical breach.
Perhaps the German Chancellor meant that the duty to observe
the treaty rested on the rules of conventional law-the lawyers'
code-and that a higher law justified the invasion. If this is the
defence, the method is sanctioned by legal procedure, for every
rule of conventionallaw may be attacked on the ground that it
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is in conflict with fundamental and controlling principles. The
act of Germany involves relatiop,s between states, collective
standards of conduct, and she is entitled to the benefit of established principles governing them. She has a right to invoke the
philosophy of law in the determination of the question presented.
This is a field in which German scholars have recently won
distinction. One of the most eminent of the group, Josef
Kohler, expresses his conception of the basis of international
relations as follows:
"The division of mankind into states was indispensable; it had this great
advantage, that the members of the different states could develop their
qualities and talents without being hindered by the contradictory views and
endeavours of others who were dominated by an entirely different view of life.
Such a national formation is of special value because it is the only way in
which a uniformly gifted national group can develop its own life, its own
talents, and abilities to the utmost . . . . In this way state confronts state,
each for itself, but each dependent on the other for certain cultural purposes.
This constellation led originally to a kind of anarchy, for among the states, in
conformity with the principle of sovereignty, no law is known. . .. This
condition is unendurable and cannot exist alongside of the great cultural mission
of humanity . . . . When once the idea has arisen in this way that there is some
law above the state, a so-called super-national law, we have gained a new plane of
culture . . . . Of course such international legal customs always mean an
interference with the power of the individual state; hence we have to struggle
against very strong counter-currents of individualistic national nature ...•
Nevertheless the idea must gradually penetrate, and when it has become fully
developed, the chief step towards the peace of nations has been taken . . . .
Agreements between states have a double significance: (a) they create rights,
either of the parties, or of individual persons, so that the latter can refer
directly to the treaty in demanding their rights; (b) in addition they have this
significance, that they establish internationallegal principles; thus they contribute to the growth of the law as an international customary law."

The view that the cultural mission of law halts at national
boundaries finds little support in this statement. Nor is the
treaty that paves the way for the advance of social justice into
international relations, defined as a "piece of paper," whose
violation is of trifling consequence. That the preservation of
the independence of Belgium, as one of a group of cultural states
which in living its own life, serves all, is imperative is implied
in his analysis of the function of states.
The history of the origin and growth of legal conceptions
confirms Kohler's view. In the final analysis the social progress
of the modern state, in contrast with the progress of the ancient
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state, is not due to superior conceptions of social justice, but to
the application of the conception to wider circles. In one sense
the doctrine of "inherent and inalienable rights" is the product
of the French and American Revolutions,-in the sense that
through these movements the collective expression of these
rights was achieved. There were Greeks in Aristotle's day who
held that a human being could not become property because the
status was contrary to natural law. The socialists of Israel-the
prophets-saw clearly that any practice that destroys selfrespect and the sense of dignity, violates the principle of social
justice.
•• No man shall take the nether or the upper millstone to pledge, for he taketh
a man's life to pledge."
"When thou dost lend thy brother anything, thou shalt not go into his
house to fetch his pledge. Thou shalt stand abroad, and the man to whom
thou dost lend shall bring out the pledge."

In these provisions, and in the provisions for the redemption
of a house within a year, for the seventh year of release, the
modern exemption, redemption and bankruptcy laws are clearly
outlined. In that famous passage in the thirteenth chapter of
I. Corinthians, Paul declares that in human relations the
spirit of good will is the foundation of the moral order, and
that all other things are as "sounding brass." No higher
level has been attained in modern days. The difference is
that what was once a social ideal, an individual's standard of
conduct, has been accepted in part as a collective standard,
and passed into the group of rules behind which the collective
will is operative.
Why does the collective standard lag so far behind the individual standard? No historical explanation is complete that does
not take into account the whole past. Some of the fundamental
causes are revealed in social psychology .
.. It has become almost a commonplace, " says President Lowell, .. that the
elder breed of political and economic philosophers erred in regarding man as a
purely rational being, guided by selfish aims; whereas he is really, in the main,
a creature of suggestion, whose strongest impulses are often generous. Later
experience and modem psychology have started a new train of thought, have
given us a different standpoint from which to study mankind."

Our ancestors began the ascent with the simple instincts shared
by the higher animals. The conservation of life depended upon
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action and those instincts were the springs of action. Before
invention and co-operation had multiplied human power, survival
depended upon the resources of the individual. The instinct in
this contest was of high value because warning and appropriate
action were in effect simultaneous. When the instinct of flight,
for example, was excited, the corresponding emotion of fear
drove the human machine instantly at its maximum speed.
When the combative instinct was stirred, the corresponding
emotion of anger made the machine strike its hardest blow. Before the primary emotions were compounded, partly through the
formation of sentiments, to arouse anyone instinct was to arouse
only its accompanying emotion. The savage whose combative
instinct is excited by the presence of an enemy, experiences a
thrill of delight in killing an infant before its mother's eye. That
the tendency of the instinct to arouse emotion in the original form
is not wholly suppressed is shown in the action of civilized white
men who, under sudden and severe provocation, watch with
pleasure the dying agony of the negro, burning alive. War is a
powerful stimulus, and the twentieth-century soldier hurls bombs,
not alone at armies, but into cities where defenceless women and
children dwell.
How, in the evolutionary process, the emotions of the combative and self-assertive instincts were commandeered by the
parental instinct as the family group broadened into the clan and
tribe, is a long story. It is enough to say that when the wrong
done to another came to excite anger in the higher phase of
righteous indignation, when the sense of fellowship led to the
conception of a universal fraternity held together by rules based
upon social justice, the attainment of these ideals has been
obstructed at every turn by the reversion to original forms of the
emotions of the combative and self-assertive instincts. In the
range of intellect, the ancient Greek is not inferior to the modern
European. N or was he lacking in moral standards. Yet the
effect of war upon a race highly civilized was so striking that the
Greek historian Thucydides was profoundly impressed with its
lesson. A brief quotation may be pardoned:
"Revenge was dearer than self-preservation. Any agreements sworn to by
either party, when they could do nothing else, were binding as long as both
were powerless. But he who on a favourable opportunity first took courage
and struck at his enemy when he saw him off his guard, had greater pleasure in
a perfidious, than he would have had in an open, act of revenge; he congratu-
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lated himself that he had taken the safer course, and also that he had overreached his enemy, and gained the prize of superior ability. . . . Thus revolution gave birth to every form of wickedness in Hellas. The simplicity which
is so large an element in a noble nature was laughed to scorn and disappeared.
An attitude of perfidious antagonism everywhere prevailed; for there was no
word binding enough, nor oath terrible enough, to reconcile enemies. Each
man was strong only in the conviction that nothing was secure; he must look
to his own safety, and could not afford to trust others. . . . At such a time the
life of the city was all in disorder, and human nature, which is always ready to
transgress the laws, having now trampled them under foot, delighted to show
that her passions were ungovernable,-that she was stronger than justice, and
the enemy of everything above her."

In that war which Thucydides observed, the parties marched
to battle under the banner of a principle, Athens, "upholding the
constitutional equality of the many, " Sparta, the" wisdom of an
aristocracy." Change the names of the cities and of the
banners, and the passage quoted applies to the Italian cities of
the Middle Ages, whose brilliant achievements in art, letters, and
industry gave promise of world leadership. The primal combative instinct was excited by endless controversy, and the joy of
revenge exceeded all other satisfactions. In the orgy of brutal
passion the light of culture went out.
In the seventeenth century two religious parties in Germany,
each asserting cultural superiority, appealed to the decision of
war. When, at the end of thirty years, exhaustion terminated
the struggle, it is estimated there were six million inhabitants left
out of a population of twenty millions. Cities and villages were
in ashes, churches and schools closed, large farming districts
abandoned. The fundamental teaching of the professed religion,
that faith of the power "to remove mountains, " and fidelity that
"gives the body to bum, " are. as "sounding brass" without the
spirit of good will, fell on deaf ears when the environment aroused
the primal combative instinct with its fierce, absorbing passion.
One excuse put forward for the invasion of Belgium is that
France intended to violate the treaty. According to legal
standards this is beside the point. The court of justice does
not permit the accused to plead as a defence that another would
have committed the robbery had he refrained. In this paper
it is assumed that Germany in good faith believes her cause to
be just. The siren song of superior culture in religion and
politics rarely fails to elicit this belief, and it is not strange
that France, Germany, Austria, England, and Russia, each in-
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vokes the same God to vindicate justice by the defeat of its
enemy.
Professor Munsterberg misses the point when he complains
that Americans, in judging the act of Germany, do not think, but
feel. The American environment is such that the conception
of justice expressed in the Declaration of Independence is not
the subject of debate. International lines stretch across the
western continent, guarded by no forts, no sentries. Energy is
not directed to the invention of huge siege guns that will destroy
the cities and homes of another nation. The sense of security
in Canada and the United States rests not in armies and guns,
but in the belief that the standard of social justice is not suspended at the border line. It is the presence of the German
army in Belgium, the destruction it has worked, that arouses
feeling in America. An innocent people is suffering. The guilty
intent of France and England is another question. The wrong
was done by Germany, and proof that the pot is as black as the
kettle is not to the point.
Legal philosophy finds no middle ground in the analysis of the
Belgian situation. At bottom the invasion admits of no justification save under the rule that "the powerful exact what they can,
and the weak grant what they must." This rule is the highway
to anarchy. In every instance the application of it has excited
an instinct whose passions culture is powerless to control. That
the passion is directed to the service of religious, political, or
cultural ideals does not modify its fierceness as the history
of religious inquisitions and political revolutions proves. The
anathemas of hate that the philosophers, divines, scientists, and
artists of Europe are hurling at opposing nations are an example.
And yet Germany wonders that infuriated Belgians mutilate
wounded soldiers. If the stimulation of mere patriotism causes
the explosion of wrath in Hauptmann and Eucken, what must
the pitch of frenzied emotion be in the Belgian peasant whose
home is in ashes?
.
The exhibition of elemental passion in Belgium, the atrocities
committed by the invaded and the invaders, are deeply
significant. The meaning is that if the condition were universal,
if every weaker state on the globe were simultaneously subjected
to the same treatment accorded Belgium by a stronger neighbour,
the volcanoes of passion would bury modem civilization deeper
than plummet ever sounded. Legal philosophy cannot give its
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sanction to an act which, if it became a rule of action, would
destroy the social order.
While the spoliation of Belgium is converting civilized men to
savagery there are counter influences elsewhere. The effect of
low collective standards of conduct is shown in startling colours.
The world sees that oppression is equally hateful whether committed by individuals or nations. If America continues to feel
deeply, in spite of Professor Munsterberg's criticism, a public
opinion may form of such power that no nation will hereafter
dare to override the law of social justice.
eRAS. SUMNER ALLEN.

San Jose, California.

